The Concessions Table (Give/Get)

Strengths: the tool disciplines preparation and replaces emotional improvisation with a reasoned logic of exchange; it creates value by exploiting differences in valuation (low-cost / high-value concessions); it protects margins because each concession becomes conditional and compensated; it provides an "if/then" script directly usable at the table and a controlled sequence that signals the limit. Weaknesses: the assessment of the "value to the other" rests on often-uncertain assumptions that must be tested; too mechanical an application can rigidify and turn a relationship into transactional haggling; the table is only as good as the quality of the information gathered upstream and can give a false impression of control; finally, it presupposes genuinely multiple variables: in a single-criterion negotiation (price alone), its power collapses.

Particularly effective when the negotiation is multi-variable (several levers beyond price: lead times, volumes, warranties, services, scope), when the parties value the stakes differently (an exploitable asymmetry), when preparation time and information on the other's priorities are available, and in relationships meant to last where the balance of exchanges matters. It is also valuable whenever you fear conceding under emotional pressure or facing a demanding negotiator. It is, on the other hand, poorly suited to strictly distributive single-variable negotiations, to extreme-urgency situations without preparation time, or when the relationship first requires an unconditional gesture of trust.

Sales · The give/get grid of a multi-year SaaS contract, A scenario representative of the software sector: a vendor prepares their Concessions Table before negotiating a strategic renewal. On the "give" side, they identify variables with low marginal cost but high perceived value to the client: enhanced onboarding, priority support, administrator training, a discount on volume tiers. On the "get" side, they prioritize a thirty-six-month commitment, a no-termination clause for the first year and a publishable case study. At the table, each concession is delivered as "if/then" ("if you commit to three years, then I include priority support") following a decreasing pattern. Typical result: the final discount is lower than the one an unprepared seller would have given up, because the value was returned through low-cost services rather than through price. This sequence illustrates the mechanism without claiming to reproduce an identified real contract.

Business · Industrial purchasing: paying in non-price currency, A case representative of a purchasing department facing a supplier under cash-flow strain. Rather than demanding only a price reduction, the buyer mobilizes their table and spots a "give" that costs them little but is worth a lot to the seller: payment within fifteen days instead of sixty, plus firm purchase forecasts over twelve months. In return ("get"), they obtain a tiered price reduction and a dedicated safety stock. The exchange works precisely because cash flow has an asymmetric value: critical for the supplier, manageable for the buyer. This is the canonical illustration of the "low cost to me, high value to the other" principle at the heart of the tool.

• Confusing concession and exchange: giving up a "give" without demanding a "get" in return, which depreciates the value conceded and invites the other to keep asking for more.
• Overestimating or guessing the value to the other without testing it: building the whole table on unverified assumptions about what matters to the other side.
• Making increasing or evenly sized concessions, which signal that you can still give up more, instead of a decreasing pattern that announces the limit.
• Treating the table as a mechanical checklist and emptying all your variables too quickly, without keeping a reserve or listening to the real counterpart.
• Forgetting to distinguish negotiable variables, resistance points and red lines, and inadvertently conceding a vital interest under pressure.

To recognize the technique in the other party: they systematically make their concessions conditional ("if… then…"), refuse free gestures, move by decreasing tiers and seem to have a prepared stock of counterparts. To defend yourself: prepare your own give/get table so as not to face the exchange from a position of improvisation; do not reveal your real priorities too early, since they are used to calibrate what is "sold" to you at a high price; challenge the implicit assessment by asking the other to justify the value they attribute to their concessions; beware of a "give" presented as costly when it is not (a false concession) and demand proportionate counterparts; finally, keep in mind your red lines and your fallback solution (BATNA) so as not to trade a vital interest for secondary variables.

Limits: the tool presupposes reliable information on the other's priorities, often unavailable; it loses its power in a single-variable negotiation; it can induce an over-rationalization that neglects the relational and emotional dimension; and it gives an illusion of mastery if the value assessments are wrong. Ethics: the principle of conditionality is legitimate, but the tool goes off the rails if it serves to fabricate false concessions (presenting as costly what is not), to exploit an information asymmetry deceptively, or to instrumentalize the other's distress (typically in a crisis, where the manipulation of vital "gives" must remain strictly framed). The line lies in transparency about the nature of the exchange and respect for the fundamental interests of the counterpart; the objective remains a sustainable agreement, not the extortion of a value known to be unbalanced.

Related techniques: Gavin Kennedy's "list of tradables/negotiable variables" and his principle of conditionality (the "Purple Principle", the "if/then"); the Concessions Matrix of the sales and purchasing schools; logrolling (exchanging concessions on issues valued differently) drawn from the work on value creation; the mutual-gains options of principled negotiation (Fisher & Ury); value creation through the exploitation of differences in Lax & Sebenius; the planning and pattern of decreasing concessions; and, upstream, the definition of the BATNA and the resistance points that bound the table.

• Gavin Kennedy, "Everything is Negotiable" (Random House Business), chapters on tradables and conditionality ("nothing is given, everything is exchanged").
• David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, "3-D Negotiation" (Harvard Business Review Press, 2006), value creation through differences in valuation.
• Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, article "Four Strategies for Making Concessions in Negotiation" (pon.harvard.edu).
• "Concession Matrix / Give-Get planner" templates offered by purchasing and sales training firms (Scotwork, RED BEAR, Shapiro Negotiations Institute).

• Gavin Kennedy (2008) Everything is Negotiable: How to Get the Best Deal Every Time Random House Business Books (4th ed.)
• David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius (1986) The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain The Free Press, New York
• David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius (2006) 3-D Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals Harvard Business Review Press, Boston