Interest Mapping

• Difficulty: Intermediate
• Estimated effectiveness: Very high
• Time to implement: Thorough preparatory work
• Fields of application: Negotiation theory, Mediation, Diplomacy, HR, Family law
• Synonyms: Interest analysis, Interest mapping, Positions vs interests, Stakes mapping
• Tags: interests, positions, Fisher-Ury, mapping, preparation

Interest mapping is the prerequisite of all value creation: by distinguishing positions from interests, it reveals that the real conflict is often far narrower, and more soluble, than the clash of demands suggests. It feeds logrolling and mutual-gain options. Its strength is also its dependency: it requires information about the other's interests, information that mistrust or strategy may withhold.

To be carried out in preparation for any negotiation of consequence, and refined during the session through open questions ('why is this important to you?'). Indispensable as soon as positions appear deadlocked: it is beneath them that the solution lies. Always useful, it is decisive in integrative negotiation, in mediation and in diplomacy.

Recognise: the other side questions you on the 'why' of your demands and reformulates your interests. Neutralise: disclose only the interests you choose to share; keep covered those that would weaken your position. Turn it around: map their interests in turn to identify their real constraints and the levers of exchange to your advantage.

Mapping rests on information that is often partial and on fallible inferences about the other's interests; reading them wrongly distorts the whole strategy. Ethically, a fine-grained knowledge of the other's interests can serve to exploit their vulnerabilities (fear, urgency) rather than to create value. Some identity-based interests (honour, belonging) resist any rational reformulation. Finally, disclosing one's own interests carries a strategic risk.

An implementation of the second principle of principled negotiation; it feeds directly into Logrolling, MESOs and the mutual-gains approach. It breaks down into a typology of substantive / procedural / relational interests. It stands in opposition to positional bargaining, which stays at the surface of demands without ever questioning their motive.

• Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 1981.
• David Lax & James Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator, 1986.
• Roger Fisher & Daniel Shapiro, Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate, 2005.

• Distinguish, for each party, the stated positions from the underlying interests (needs, fears, constraints, aspirations)
• List all the stakeholders, including those absent from the table (the final decision-maker, internal departments, allies, funders), and rank their stakes and their influence
• Identify shared, compatible and genuinely conflicting interests in order to pinpoint the value-creating zones of exchange
• Build options for agreement that address each party's priority interests rather than median compromises on positions
• Anticipate possible alliances and obstructions in order to order one's discussion strategy and questioning

Diplomatic · Camp David 1978: the Sinai, sovereignty against security: During the Camp David negotiations of 1978, Egypt demanded the complete return of the Sinai, occupied by Israel since 1967, while Israel wanted to keep part of it: map after map, no dividing line satisfied both positions. By mapping the underlying interests, the American mediators brought to light that Egypt's stake was sovereignty (the Sinai, Egyptian land since the pharaohs) and Israel's stake security (no armour on its border). The solution then became apparent: full return of the Sinai to Egypt, but largely demilitarised. This case, analysed by Fisher and Ury in Getting to Yes, led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979.

Sales · Representative scenario: the price cut that concealed a need for budgetary security: Representative scenario: an industrial supplier prepares for the annual renegotiation with a key-account buyer who announces a double-digit price cut demand. Rather than preparing a counter-position, the team maps the stakeholders (the buyer, the finance director, the client's production department, its own sales director) and their probable interests. The map reveals that the buyer's position mainly covers a need for budgetary visibility over two years and an internal-image concern towards their management, while the supplier's priority interest is to smooth its workload plan. The negotiation concludes with a multi-year volume commitment against an indexed price and an immediate symbolic gesture: each obtains satisfaction on its dominant interest, without conceding on the essentials.

• Confusing positions and interests: mapping the stated demands ('I want -10%') instead of the motivations that drive them
• Forgetting the stakeholders absent from the table (the final decision-maker, internal departments, funders, allies) whose interests nonetheless bear on the agreement
• Fixing the map before the meeting and never updating it with the information gathered through questioning during the session
• Projecting one's own priorities onto the other party instead of validating each hypothesis about an interest through open questions
• Mapping only economic interests and neglecting identity-based and relational interests (recognition, image, security, fairness)

• Fisher, R., Ury, W. & Patton, B. (1981) Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In Houghton Mifflin
• Sebenius, J. K. (1992) Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review Management Science, 38(1), 18-38, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.38.1.18
• Lax, D. A. & Sebenius, J. K. (2006) 3-D Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals Harvard Business School Press