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Negotiating a shareholders' agreement: lock down what matters before it's too late

Publié le 19 September 2025

Negotiating a shareholders' agreement: lock down what matters before it's too late

A shareholders' agreement is signed in the euphoria of a launch and re-read in the pain of a falling-out. That is precisely why you should negotiate a shareholders' agreement with the same rigour as a multi-million-pound contract: this document decides who is in charge, who leaves, at what price, and who keeps control the day someone wants out. The good news is that negotiating an agreement isn't a legal battle, it's an exercise in clarity, in advance. Here is how a practitioner approaches it.

What is really at stake in an agreement

The articles of association set the legal scene; the agreement governs the real balance of power. Three areas account for 90% of future disputes: governance (who decides what, and by what majority), share transfers (pre-emption, approval, joint exit), and the departure of founders (good/bad leaver, vesting). Before any meeting, list your ideal position and your walk-away point for each area. Without that framing, you negotiate blind and give in to whoever pushes hardest.

  • Governance: reserved matters, right of veto, board seats.
  • Liquidity: pre-emption, drag-along, tag-along, put and call options.
  • Departure: four-year vesting, definition of a bad leaver, buyback price.

Build your fallback before you sit down

Strength in negotiation never comes from the desire to sign, but from the ability not to sign. Your best alternative (BATNA) in an agreement is your honest answer to the question: what happens if this agreement isn't signed? A founder who brings the technology and can raise funds elsewhere has a solid fallback. A minority shareholder who has already put everything in has none: they must build it beforehand, not during. The sharper your fallback, the better you can hold firm on the exit clauses without caving to calendar pressure.

Camille's story: three per cent that were worth a company

Camille joins two founders as the third partner, taking 15% of the equity in exchange for her commercial network. The draft agreement, prepared by the other two, provided for a four-year vesting period and a bad-leaver clause buying back her shares at their nominal value in the event of a non-culpable departure. In other words: leaving after three years, even amicably, would have cost her almost everything she had built.

She calls me, tense. My first piece of advice: don't attack the figure, understand the intention. In the meeting, she applies tactical empathy: « You want to avoid a partner walking off with shares without having contributed over the long term. That's fair. » The two founders relax: yes, that is exactly their fear. The problem wasn't Camille, it was a precedent they had lived through with a former colleague.

She follows up with a calibrated question: « How am I supposed to throw myself into this for four years if an amicable departure wipes out the value of my work? » Silence. Then she brings out her objective criteria: two comparable agreements from start-ups in the same sector, where the bad-leaver clause applies only in cases of gross misconduct, and where an amicable departure is bought back at market value. The debate moves away from the balance of power and settles on an external standard that is hard to contest.

One of the founders then offers a buyback at 50% of value. Camille uses strategic silence: she doesn't answer, letting the offer hang. The other founder, uncomfortable with the void, raises it to 80% of his own accord. She closes with a give-and-take: she accepts a four-year vesting period (their need for commitment) in return for a clear distinction between good and bad leaver and a buyback at fair value in the event of a non-culpable departure. Signed. Three years later, Camille left amicably; her shares were worth more than 200,000 euros. The original clause would have reduced them to a few hundred.

The levers to handle with precision

The first number carries a lot of weight. If you are in a position to propose, set a reasoned anchor point on the valuation or the exit price: it steers the entire discussion. Faced with an objection, mirroring (repeating the last two or three words of your counterpart) often surfaces the missing information. And be wary of calendar pressure, « we have to sign before the fundraising round », which is a classic use of the sense of urgency to make you drop a governance clause. A badly negotiated agreement is paid for over years; a few days' delay costs nothing.

Finally, not everything is negotiable in one go. Concede what costs you little (a pre-emption deadline, quarterly reporting) so you can hold firm on what is vital (the buyback price, the veto right over dilution). This is the art of the calibrated concession: giving something visible to keep hold of the essential.

Your roadmap before signing

  • Write down your fallback and your walk-away point before the first meeting.
  • Carefully distinguish good leaver from bad leaver, and the buyback price attached to each.
  • Lock in the veto right over decisions that dilute you.
  • Anchor every sensitive clause to a verifiable external standard.
  • Have a lawyer review it, but negotiate the intention yourself.

To identify the technique suited to your precise situation, browse the library by case, or practise this negotiation on the simulator before the real meeting.

FAQ

Should you negotiate yourself or let the lawyer handle it?

The lawyer secures the drafting and spots the legal traps: their role is indispensable. But the negotiation of intentions, what you agree to give up and what you refuse, belongs to you. No one will defend your interests as a shareholder better than you, because no one knows your fallback and your walk-away point as well as you do. Prepare the strategy with the lawyer, but do the talking yourself.

Which clause is most often botched?

The buyback price on departure, and the definition of the bad leaver. Many founders sign up to a buyback at nominal value without realising that a future disagreement, even an amicable one, can be reclassified to deprive them of the value they created. Insist on a clear distinction between culpable and non-culpable departure, and a price anchored to an objective valuation. On the day of conflict, it's the clause worth the most.

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